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Amendment*
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Cable television has grown explosively over the past two decades.
While many more persons watch many more cable channels and
much more diverse cable programming today, federal, state, and
local regulatory bodies still tend to view cable television as the
more limited technology it once was. The fact that regulation has
not kept pace with technological change has created particular
problems in the First Amendment area, as judges, legislators, and
regulators struggle to define the constitutional rights associated
with what clearly is a medium of expression, but one that does not
fit neatly into either of the pigeonholes - printed press or broadcaster - traditionally used to classify the mass media.
This article assesses the impact of the changing nature of cable
on the First Amendment rights of cable operators. It examines how
these rights are currently affected by federal "fairness doctrine"
and "equal time" requirements, and by local government public
access requirements. The basic conclusion of the paper is that, for
First Amendment purposes, cable systems should be treated in the
same manner as newspapers. Like newspaper publishers, cable operators should be free of government attempts to tell them what
must be said on, or who must have access to, their medium of
expression.
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I.
Introduction: The Changing Nature of Cable
Television
In approaching the question of the First Amendment status of
cable television, it is important to understand how the nature of
cable service has changed. Fifteen years ago, what we today call
"cable television" was not even known by that name; it was instead
called "community antenna television" (CATV). As the name reflected, cable service was, in effect, a substitute for, or an addition
to, the home television antenna. Cable subscribers received over
wire the conventional broadcast signals they could not receive, or
could not receive as well, with a home antenna. Cable was thus
largely limited to geographical areas that were unserved or underserved by conventional broadcast stations.'
In this earlier era, the role of the cable operator was largely passive, confined to serving "as a kind of funnel for other broadcasting."' The operator originated little or no programming and, because of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) - rules
governing the retransmission of broadcast signals, exercised little
editorial control over the material shown on the cable system.
Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Supreme
Court in 1968 found FCC regulation of cable to be justified as
"reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's broadcast regulation responsibilities,' or that the Commission in 1969 extended the fairness doctrine and equal time requirements, both developed in the broadcast context, to cable." Nor is it surprising that neither the Court
nor the Commission considered whether cable operators might
have First Amendment rights different from those of broadcasters.'
Today, the situation with regard to cable has changed dramatically. While cable operators continue to retransmit television
broadcast signals, they also transmit programs that they produce
1. For discussions of cable.service in the mid to late 1960s, see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v.
United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1968); United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 161-63 (1968); Greater Fremont, Inc. v. City of Fremont, 302 F.
Supp. 652, 656-58 (N.D. Ohio 1968); Note, The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV, 79 HARV.
L. REv. 366, 366-67 (1965).
2. Note, supra note 1, at 367.
3. United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
4. First Report and Order in Docket No. 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969). For a discussion
of the fairness doctrine and equal time rules, see text at notes 25-30, infra.
5. See First Report and Order in Docket No. 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 221-22 (1969) (analyzing First Amendment rights of cable operators by reference to rights of broadcasters).
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or purchase and that are shown only on cable. News, public affairs,
and entertainment programming is available to the cable operator
from a variety of non-broadcast sources, including national cable
"networks" made possible by satellite delivery systems. In addition, many cable systems show locally-originated programming,
ranging from local news to live city council sessions to local theatrical and musical performances. Finally, cable operators are beginning to use the medium in new ways, by, for example, making information services available in an "electronic print" format.'
The changes in the cable television medium mean that the cable
system operator's role has changed as well. Now, the operator is
beginning to function essentially as does a newspaper or magazine
editor or publisher. His staff develops or directly purchases some
of the news and entertainment features, while others are drawn
from national services. The operator, like a newspaper editor,
must exercise editorial. judgment and control, deciding what is
shown and what is not, what needs revision and what editorial policies are appropriate. 8
While the uses of the cable medium and the role of the cable
operator have changed significantly over the past two decades, the
legal environment within which cable operates has not kept pace.
At the federal level, cable for the most part continues to be treated
as if it were a broadcast medium, subject to certain of the same
affirmative duties as are broadcasters. Unlike broadcasters, however, cable operators are also subject to a host of local requirements, imposed by state and local governments as part of the process by which cable franchises are granted. The result of this
regulatory structure is to burden the cable medium in a way that
6. See generally Cable Television Bureau, FCC, Cable Television and the Political
Broadcasting Laws: The 1980 Election Experience and Proposals for Change 3-8 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as FCC Cable Television Bur. Staff Report]. Currently, numerous cable
systems are cooperating in joint ventures with newspaper publishers to deliver local and
national news, features, financial and stock information, classified advertising, and other
services electronically to cable subscribers. For a list of such activities, see ELECTRONIC PUBLISHER, Jan. 12, 1982, at 3. As these trends continue, the question of the First Amendment
rights of cable operators becomes a question of the extent of First Amendment protection
available generally when information is transmitted electronically to homes and businesses.
7. National programming services designed exclusively for cable television have expanded
dramatically in recent years. For a list of basic and pay services, see BROADCASTING, Nov. 30,
1981, at 36.
8. Broadcasters have similar discretion, of course. See FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440
U.S. 689, 707 (1979) ("Cable operators now share with broadcasters a significant amount of
editorial discretion regarding what their programming will include"); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic National Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 105, 111 (1973).
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no other mediuim of expression is burdened, and in a way that impinges upon the First Amendment rights of the cable operator.
The remainder of this article focuses on federal, state, and local
regulations that burden cable freedom of expression,' and considers whether any of the policy interests served by the regulations
are sufficient to outweigh the constitutionally-protected interests
of the cable operator.

II.
Communications Media Regulation and the First
Amendment: An Overview
A. The Rights of the Printed Press
The First Amendment expressly prohibits government from
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."10 The purpose
of this prohibition on governmental action has been discussed by
many, but Justice Brandeis perhaps best captured its essence in a
famous concurring opinion:
Those who won our independence believed .

.

. that public dis-

cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamental
principle of the American government. They recognized the risks
to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew that
order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment for
its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope
and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by
9. As used in this article, "free expression" refers to an individual's right to be free of
affirmative regulation of speech, such as specific cable access requirements ostensibly intended to contribute diversity to the public debate. The question of negative regulation, in
which government specifies kinds of speech that may not be made in certain forums, see,
e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC power to regulate
radio broadcast that was "indecent but not obscene"), is not addressed here. It should be
noted, however, that the technology of cable television is better suited than that of broadcast television to "narrowcasting," in which programming can be delivered to specific, discrete audiences, so that, for example, children or unwilling recipients could be readily excluded from reception of programming considered appropriate only for a mature audience.
See id. at 748-50.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. I. While the First Amendment provides that "Congress shall
make no law," the Supreme Court long ago held that the amendment applies as well to
actions of the states and their subdivisions. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707
(1931).
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law-the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the
Constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed."
For newspapers and other printed media, the First Amendment
means that government may not interfere with "the exercise of editorial control and judgment."" Among the matters that government may not impose are "[tihe choice of material to go into a
newspaper, . . . the decisions made as to limitations on the size

and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues and public officials -

whether fair or unfair . . . ."I Justice Black, con-

curring in the "Pentagon Papers" case, explained the justification
for the extraordinary degree of freedom granted the press by the
First Amendment:
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free
press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our
democracy. The press was to serve the governed, not the governors. The Government's power to censor the press was abolished
so that the press would remain forever free to censure the Government. The press was protected so that it could bare the secrets
of government and inform the people."'
Thus, in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,5 the Supreme Court struck down a state statute giving political candidates
a right to a published reply to newspaper attacks against them.
The Court noted that the statute "exact[ed] a penalty on the basis
of the content of a newspaper" and as such "constituted . . . [an

unconstitutional] compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to print that which it would not otherwise print."" The Court
concluded:
A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press
responsibility is not mandated by the Constitution and like many
other virtues it cannot be legislated. 7
The fact that newspapers are protected against most governmen11. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (concurring opinion) (footnote
omitted).
12. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
13. Id. Editorial discretion is not unfettered, however. The printed press is not entirely
free either to libel individuals or to publish obscenity. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
14. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (Black, J., concurring).
15. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
16. Id. at 256.
17. Id.
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tal attempts to interfere with their content does not mean that
they are free of all forms of government regulation. To the contrary, they are subject to, inter alia, antitrust laws,' 8 labor laws,' 9
and "ordinary forms of taxation." 2 0 Their trucks on the public
streets are certainly subject to the traffic laws, and presumably
government may exercise some control over the placement of newspaper stands and vending machines on public sidewalks.
Government may not, however, impose on newspapers economic
or traffic regulations that discriminatorily burden "the special institutional needs of a vigorous press." 2 ' In Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 22 for example, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional
a state tax on the advertising revenue of publications with circulations over 20,000 copies per week. The Court concluded its opinion
with language that affirms the vital importance of a free press in
our society:
[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or abridgement of
the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. The tax here involved is bad . . .
because, in the light of its history and of its present setting, it is
seen to be a deliberate and calculated device in the guise of a tax
to limit the circulation of information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the constitutional guaranties. A free press stands
as one of the great interpreters between the government and the
people. To allow it to be fettered is to fetter ourselves."

B. The Rights of the Broadcast Media
The broad protection accorded the printed press from governmental interference has not been extended to the best known, most
pervasive branch of what some have called the "telecommunications press" or the "electronic press."2 " Television and radio broad2 but they are also subcasters have some First Amendment rights,"
18. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
19. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
20. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
21. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 383
(1973).
22. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
23. Id. at 250.
24. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213;
Douglas, The First Amendment and The Electronic Press, 10 U.W.L.A. L. REv. 123 (1978).
25. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94
(1973) (refusing to mandate access to broadcast time for groups seeking to place paid edito-
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ject to a host of affirmative programming requirements imposed by
the Congress and the FCC, including general ones relating to operating in the public interest, being responsive to the public, and ensuring diversity.2 Of more direct First Amendment concern are
three specific, content-based requirements:
(1) The "FairnessDoctrine" - While this was developed by the
FCC on a case-by-case basis, it was apparently incorporated into
section 315(a) of the Communications Act.17 It requires broadcasters to devote time to issues of public importance and to present
contrasting points of view on these issues. 8
(2) The "Equal Opportunities" or "Equal Time" Requirement
- Also codified in section 315(a), this requires that if one candidate for a public office "usels] a broadcasting station," other candidates for the same office must be given "equal opportunities" to
use that station. 29
(3) The "Reasonable Access" Requirement - Section 312(a)(7)
of the Act requires broadcasters "to allow reasonable access to or
to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of time" on broadcast
stations by federal political candidates."
The nature of the First Amendment questions raised by these
three requirements has been graphically illustrated by one
commentator:
What if Thomas Paine had been ordered to devote a portion of
his pamphlets to the British position? What if Virginia newspapers were required to give George III equal time after Thomas
Jefferson lambasted him in a column? What if the evening edirial advertisements).
The Supreme Court has construed the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and
of the press to apply to any "significant medium for the communication of ideas," Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952), but has further held that "differences in
the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them," Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Because of
perceived differences in the "characteristics" of broadcasting, "of all forms of communication, it is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment protection."
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). See also FCC v. National Citizens
Comm'n for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 798-800 (1978); Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49 (1961).
26. See generally Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40
Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 97-150 (1967).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).
28. See FCC Cable Television Bur. Staff Report, supra note 6, at 19-21.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a).
30. Id. at § 312(a)(7).
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tion of your local newspaper were permitted to print only those
stories which would be "fit" for the entire family? If newspapers
were governed by the same laws as television, results such as
these could occur."
Despite the questions that are raised when a newspaper analogy
is applied to broadcasting, the Supreme Court has held that such
an analogy is not appropriate. The principal justification used by
the Court has been one of scarcity, based on the fact that the radio
spectrum is inherently limited. 2 As early as 1943, Justice Frankfurter wrote for the Court:
Freedom of utterance is abridged to many who wish to use the
limited facilities of radio. Unlike other modes of expression, radio
inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic,
and that is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to
governmental regulation."
But the scarcity rationale was not fully developed until 1969 when

the Court in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States3 4 said in
the context of the fairness doctrine:
Where there are substantially more individuals who want to
broadcast than there are frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit
an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write or publish. . . .
Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose
views should be expressed on this unique medium. . . . It is the

right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.35
The factual premise of broadcast spectrum scarcity is open to
question. At present, there are unassigned frequencies, and in the
near future, as a result of pending FCC proceedings, there are
likely to be many more broadcast outlets." As these FCC proceed31. Douglas, supra note 24, at 123.
32. In addition to the scarcity rationale, a number of other justifications have been advanced for television content regulation, including: the fact of public ownership of the electromagnetic spectrum; the theory that use of a frequency is a privilege to which conditions
may be attached; the significant capacity of the electronic media to influence the piblic; the
difficulty of avoiding unwanted parts of a television or radio program (e.g., commercials);
the accessibility of electronic media to children; and the inherent limitations imposed by
technology and the clock on a station owner's ability to maximize profits. See Note, Cable
Television and the First Amendment, 71 CoLuM. L. REv. 1008, 1018-25 (1971).
33. National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
34. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
35. Id. at 388, 390.
36. Proceedings currently underway at the FCC have the potential to expand significantly

No. 41

CABLE, REGULATION & FIRST AMENDMENT

585

ings suggest, and as commentators have pointed out, broadcast
spectrum "scarcity" has been in part government-created, since
the FCC has limited broadcast licenses in order to ensure that the
private broadcast system remains economically viable.37
In any event, even if the assertion of spectrum scarcity is taken
at face value, neither the Red Lion Court nor any other court or
agency has adequately explained why the premise of spectrum
scarcity should lead to the legal conclusion that broadcasters do
not have the same First Amendment rights with regard to content
as do other mass media. Scarcity implies a need for allocating the
scarce resource, and certainly government may legitimately step in
to perform the allocation function by imposing a licensing process.
When expressive activity must be licensed by government, however, customary First Amendment analysis requires not less but
more judicial scrutiny to ensure that the licensing authority limits
its regulations to the minimum needed to further governmental
purposes unrelated to the suppression of speech."
The First Amendment and such federal regulations as the fairness doctrine share the common goals of seeking to prevent monopolization of information dissemination and seeking to promote
diversity through "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate.3 9
The implicit premise is that where broadcast outlets are limited,
the power to make decisions and to influence others is concentrated in the hands of the few who are licensed, raising the specter
of "private" censorship. Private censorship, the theory holds, is inconsistent with the goal of the First Amendment to produce "an
informed public capable of conducting its own affairs." 4 0 To be
properly informed, the public must "receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences."1
To assure such access in the presence of private censorship power,
the number of radio and television outlets. See, e.g., FCC Gen. Docket No. 80-603 (direct
broadcast satellites); FCC BC Docket No. 78-253 (low-power television).
37. See Goldberg & Couzens, "Peculiar Characteristics": An Analysis of the First
Amendment Implications of Broadcast Regulation, 31 FED. COMMUNICATIONS L.J. 1, 29
(1978); Robinson, supra note 26, at 88.
38. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); Goldberg & Couzens, supra
note 37, at 27.
39. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S 254, 270 (1964).
40. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 392 (1969). As the Court said in
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), the First Amendment "rests on the
assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public . . . ."
41. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
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the Supreme Court in Red Lion shifted the constitutional focus
from the right of the broadcaster to speak to the right of the listener to hear.
Under this listener-oriented approach, the government is viewed
as the champion of the people's right to hear, ensuring through
regulation of the speaker that everything worth saying shall be
said."' This approach, however, is fundamentally inconsistent with
the premise of the Constitution and the First Amendment." The
founders created a form of government in which they granted limited powers to the federal and state apparatus. Some governmental
powers, like the power to abridge freedom of speech or of the
press, were denied; all other powers were reserved to the people."
This reflected their conscious decision to govern themselves rather
than to be governed by others. Thus the founders accepted the
possibility of private censorship, recognizing that if one person
suppresses a fact, another may publish it, while if the government
suppresses a fact it may well stay suppressed.
42. The First Amendment on its face is limited to the acts of speaking and publishing, as
opposed to hearing or receiving; the Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
. . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has construed the Amendment as guaranteeing other rights, including the right to
hear. For example, it has been held that "[t]he right of freedom of speech and press includes
not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive, the
right to read, . . . freedom of inquiry [and] freedom of thought." Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965). As Professor Thomas Emerson has pointed out:
The concept of a right to know embraces . . . the right to read, to listen, to see,
and otherwise to receive communications. . . . As early as 1965, the Warren Court
recognized that the first amendment embodies a constitutional right to know. In
Lamont v. Postmaster General, [381 U.S. 301, 303 (1965),] it upheld the right of
citizens to receive 'communist political propaganda' from abroad. . . . [a]nd four
years later, in Stanley v. Georgia, [394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969),] the Court declared
that '[i]t is now well established that the Constitution protects the right to receive
information and ideas.'
Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422, 464
(1980). This right of the public to be informed or to know has also been held to be paramount to the free speech and press rights of broadcasters:
[T]he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their
collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the
right of the broadcasters, which is paramount.
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
43. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 395 U.S. 367, 386-401 (1969).
44. As noted elsewhere in this article, see text at notes 49 and 132-34, infra, the Court has
undercut the argument that there is a constitutionally-mandated "right to hear" as to both
broadcast formats, FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 101 S. Ct. 1266 (1981), and
political advocacy, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
45. Cf. U.S. CoNsT. amend. X (reserving rights to the states and the people).
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"Authoritative selection" by government," moreover, may actually discourage true diversity in broadcast programming and instead encourage blandness. Commentators have suggested that
broadcasters faced with fairness doctrine requirements engage in
self-censorship to eliminate or "tone down" controversial programs
they fear may lead to regulatory action against them.4 7 Instead of
encouraging strong, committed, persuasive speech, the fairness
doctrine apparently encourages a timid, "on-the-one-hand, on-theother-hand" approach. Rather than through a fairness doctrine,
therefore, it is through diverse and antagonistic sources of speech
and expression that society can best assure the "unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social
changes desired by the people.""
Perhaps for these reasons, and consistent with a general national
trend toward deregulation, the Supreme Court and the FCC are
moving away from mandating diversity by content regulation, and
toward "relying on market forces to promote diversity.""" The
Court in 1981 upheld the Commission's policy decision to rely on
the market as "the best method of promoting diversity in [radio]
entertainment formats."" This decision is consistent with the approach that Congress has taken toward federal regulation in such
fields as airlines," trucking, and banking," and it reflects an
emerging national consensus that the marketplace is more likely
than a federal agency to anticipate and meet "the varied and
changing tastes of the . . . public."14 As part of this national trend
toward deregulation, the FCC has proposed elimination of the fairness doctrine and the equal time and reasonable access requirements.5 4 1.
46. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (three-judge

court) (L. Hand, J.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
47. See, e.g., Bazelon, supra note 24, at 215; Douglas, supra note 24, at 136-37; Simmons,
The Fairness Doctrine and Cable TV, 11 HARV. J. LEGis. 629, 652 (1974). See also Miami

Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 257 (1974) (newspaper access law might
lead editors to "conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy").
48. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (quoted with approval in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)).
49. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 101 S. Ct. 1266, (1981).
50. Id. at 4310.

51. Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705.
52. Motor Carrier Reform Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793.
53. Depository-Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132.
54. FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 101 S. Ct. 1266, (1981).
54.1. FCC Rep. No. 5068 (Sept. 17, 1981). See also Fowler, Freedom of Electronic
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III.
Federal Regulation of Cable Television
A. The Broadcaster and Newspaper Models In the
Cable Context
As discussed in Part I, cable television may at one time have fit
relatively well into the "broadcaster" category for First Amendment purposes, since cable operators did little more than retransmit broadcast signals. Today, with local origination of cable programs and the availability of cable networks, and with cable
operators beginning to function much like newspaper editors, the
newspaper analogy seems more appropriate, and the courts have
begun to move in this direction.
In the years after Red Lion, the FCC extended aspects of its regulation of conventional broadcasters to cable operators, imposing
the fairness doctrine and equal time requirements.5 5 The Commission did not have to address the issue of whether or not the scarcity of frequencies rationale used in broadcasting had any significance in the cable context;" it relied instead on the "reasonably
ancillary" justification for cable regulation." But this theory at
best provides only a jurisdictional basis for FCC cable regulation.
The "reasonably ancillary" doctrine does not provide any constitutional justification for limiting the First Amendment rights of
cable operators. The Commission's power to impose broadcast-type
content regulation on cable systems has not been ruled on by the
courts.
In its regulation of cable, however, the FCC went beyond broadcast-type rules to require cable operators to have at least 20 channels and to dedicate four of them for public, governmental, educational, and leased access. Such sweeping access requirements had
never before been imposed on broadcasters." The trend toward exSpeech, Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1981, at D7 (FCC Chairman arguing for "extend[ing] the full
rights of the First Amendment to the electronic press.")
55. See text at notes 4 and 24-30, supra. The extension of equal time requirements to
cable was carried out pursuant to an explicit statutory requirement. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a);
text at notes 88-89, infra.
56. For discussions of this issue, see, e.g., FCC Cable Television Bur. Staff Report, supra
note 6, at 6; Simmons, supra note 47, at 647.
57. See, e.g., Order in Docket No. RM-2552, 62 F.C.C. 2d 61 (1976); Memorandum Opinion and Order in Docket No. 19988, 53 F.C.C.2d 1104 (1975); First Report and Order in
Docket No. 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 221-22 & n.27 (1969). For a discussion of the "reasonably ancillary" approach, see text at note 3, supra.
58. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).

No. 4]

CABLE, REGULATION & FIRST AMENDMENT

589

pansion of this type of FCC authority over cable was reversed by
the Supreme Court in 1979, when it held in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp. (hereafter referred to as Midwest Video II) that the channel
capacity and access rules were not "reasonably ancillary" to the
Commission's authority over broadcasting.59 Since the Court's ruling was premised on the FCC's lack of jurisdiction, it did not reach
the constitutional question addressed by the court of appeals regarding the First Amendment rights of cable operators. The Supreme Court did note, however, that the question "is not
frivolous."60
While the Supreme Court in Midwest Video II did not address
the First Amendment issue, it has been addressed by lower courts
in recent years, and at least two federal courts of appeals have recognized a First Amendment right of cable operators comparable to
the right afforded newspaper owners. In Home Box Office, Inc. v.
FCC," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
found "important differences between cable and broadcast television and 'differences in the characteristics of new media justify differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.' "62
The court pointed out that there is no physical scarcity of cable
channels comparable to the scarcity of broadcast channels. 3 It
went on to state that, to the extent cable operations are "a natural
economic monopoly, . . . scarcity which is the result solely of eco-

nomic conditions is apparently insufficient to justify even limited
government intrusion into the First Amendment rights of the conventional press, and there is nothing in the record before us to suggest a constitutional distinction between cable television and newspapers on this point."64 This approach was followed by the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in the Midwest Video II case. 5
The court there concluded that "nothing in this case . . . indi-

cate[s] a constitutional distinction between cable systems and
newspapers in the context of the government's power to compel
59. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
60. Id. at 709 n.19. See also Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, - U.S.
-,
102 S.Ct. 835, 839 n.11 (Jan. 13, 1982) (declining to address question of First Amendment rights of cable operators).
61. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
62, Id. at 43 (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969)).
63. 567 F.2d at 45.
64. Id. at 46.

65. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds,
440 U.S. 689 -(1979).
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public access."66

The appellate court opinions in Home Box Office and Midwest
Video H make it clear that the technological or spectrum scarcity
argument used in Red Lion to justify content-based regulation of
broadcasting cannot be used to justify similar regulation of cable.
The question remains, however, whether the FCC or the courts will
seek to find another justification rooted in the nature of cable technology. At the least, the absence of scarcity in cable provides "an
invitation to reconsider the tension between . . . radically diver-

gent [First Amendment] approaches to the print and electronic
media." 67

B. Economic "Scarcity"
The court in Home Box Office, as noted above, rejected two
kinds of scarcity arguments in the cable context: the spectrum
scarcity approach of Red Lion and an approach based on "scarcity
which is the result solely of economic conditions."" The latter approach, however, has been advanced by others as a justification for
content regulation of cable." In many areas, as a result of the
franchising process, there is only one cable system. This limits the
number of cable channels available in a community at any given
time.o Some have perceived a danger in having one entity control
such a central medium of communications. Thus it might be argued that the FCC should regulate cable, as it regulates broadcasting, in order to ensure that a diversity of viewpoints reaches the
public.7 1
66. Id. at 1056. But see Community Communications Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 660
F.2d 1370 (10th Cir. 1981).
67. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 699 (1978).
68. 567 F.2d at 46.
69. See, e.g., Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378-79
(10th Cir. 1981); FCC Cable Television Bur. Staff Report, supra note 6, at 44-46; First Report and Order in Docket No. 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 222 n.27 (1969); Rothman, Cable TV
Needs More, Not Less, Regulation, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1981, at Dl, col. 4.

70. Whether this legal monopoly status is justified by either the physical or economic
aspects of cable operation is open to question. A cable system may add channel capacity in
response to consumer demand just as a newspaper can add printing presses to its plant or
pages to its newspaper. Second, cable franchises are for limited duration-typically 15
years-and there is no legal impediment to competitive entry of new applicants at renewal
time. For that matter, there is no legal impediment to multiple franchisees in most communities today, although cities do not generally encourage the construction of duplicative
facilities.
71. A related argument is that, because of cable's multichannel capacity, diversity can
best be prQmoted through another kind of regulation, in which at least some cable channels
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This argument is specious. In many, if not most, communities,
there is only one daily newspaper and only one entity controlling
this central medium of communication. It does not follow, however, that content regulation of newspapers or cable is warranted
constitutionally by the "oneness" of the medium of communication.72 At most, the economic position in the marketplace of both
newspapers and cable may suggest some level of economic and antitrust scrutiny by government.73 It does not provide a rationale for
access and related requirements.' As one commentator has
written:
[E]ntrusting government with power to assure media access entails at least three dangers: the danger of deterring those items of
coverage that will trigger duties of affording access at the media's
expense; the danger of inviting manipulation of the media by
whichever bureaucrats are entrusted to assure access; and the
danger of escalating from access regulation to much more dubious
exercises of governmental control.75
would be operated on a "common carrier" basis like the telephone, with the cable operator
obliged to accept programming on these channels from anyone willing to pay for the time.
See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 69. The FCC's attempt to impose "access [channel] requirements amounting to common-carrier obligations" on cable operators was struck down by the
Supreme Court as not "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's broadcast regulation authority. FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 705 (1979).
If Congress were to attempt to impose such requirements by statute, however, a constitutional question would arise that the Supreme Court has noted "is not frivolous." Id. at 709
n.19. While cable systems have been treated as common carriers for some purposes and not
for others, id. at 701 n.9 (citing National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 533
F.2d 601, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (rejecting FCC's "holistic view of cable operations")), a decision was made by the FCC, supported by the Supreme Court, not to treat cable systems
generally as common carriers, see 440 U.S. at 701 n.11 (citing United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 169 n.29 (1968), and Frontier Broadcasting Co. v. Collier, 24 F.C.C.
251 (1958)). Because cable operators were thereby given editorial discretion and control and
most of the functions of newspapers editors, see text at notes 5-7 and 61-66, supra, an attempt later to take away some of these normally protected functions would raise serious
First Amendment problems.
The principal case treating cable as a common carrier, National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs v. FCC, 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976), contains reasoning that is circular and
therefore seriously flawed. The court of appeals found that cable met the primary common
carrier criterion, a "quasi-public character" arising from an undertaking to "carry for all
people indifferently," because the FCC had required cable to provide "first-come, nondiscriminatory access" on its leased channels. Id. at 609. In other words, the court treated cable
as a common carrier because cable is required to behave like a common carrier. This begs
the question as to the proper regulatory categorization for cable based on its own functions
and intentions.
72. See Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
73. See text at notes 18-20, supra.
74. See text at notes 37-38, supra.
75. L. TRIBE, supra note 67, at 697.
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Recognition of these dangers led the Supreme Court to hold unconstitutional a statute mandating access to newspapers in Miami
Herald PublishingCo. v. Tornillo.76 The Court there considered at
length the argument of "[ajccess advocates" that newspapers are
monopoly or quasi-monopoly enterprises in many communities and
that "[t]he First Amendment interest of the public in being informed is . . . in peril because the 'marketplace of ideas' is today a

monopoly controlled by the owners of the market."" The Court
rejected this argument for mandating newspaper access, noting the
7
indangers associated with "governmental coercion" of the press,"
cluding the fact that "[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably 'dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.' "7 The Court concluded by upholding the right of the
printed press to unfettered "exercise of editorial control and
judgment. "80
Apart from problems with access or content regulation of cable
communications, the possibility of either an economic or informational cable monopoly is false, unless the relevant market is defined restrictively and tautologically as the market in which cable
television service is provided. In our information-laden society,
cable is just one of many sources of news, information, and entertainment. Unlike operators of public utilities - telephone, electric power, and water - cable operators are confronted with rival
suppliers of services that can substitute for cable television." With
respect to television, sports, or movie-type entertainment, these alternatives to cable include all of the entertainment media: adver76. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). See text at notes 15-17, supra.
77. 418 U.S. at 248-51.
78. Id. at 254. See text at notes 46-47, supra.
79. Id. at 257 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).
80. 418 U.S. at 258.
81. Cable lacks monopoly power in most markets, and the application of utility regulation
is therefore inapposite for several reasons. First, as noted above, and unlike local telephone,
water, or energy networks, consumers have alternatives to cable that keep cable from charging a monopoly price for its products. Cable's market power is further constrained by FCC
policies facilitating entry of new competitors like subscription television (STV), direct
broadcast satellites (DBS), multi-distribution satellites (MDS), and low-power television.
Second, cable's services are not generally regarded as essential, constraining cable's ability
to price its services above average costs. This is indicated by the fact that cable serves only
about 55 percent of the homes passed on a national average and experiences substantial
levels of "churn" or termination of service. Those technical studies performed support the
above empirical observations and indicate that consumer response to cable price change is
quite elastic (around 1.0) in comparison to the inelasticity of demand that characterizes
provision of "essential" utility services.
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tiser-supported "free" television and radio, noncommercial public
television and radio, over-the-air subscription television (STV),
multipoint distribution systems (MDS), live sports, movie theaters
and the "legitimate" stage, and video cassettes and discs. In the
near future, the introduction of satellite broadcasts direct to homes
(DBS) 8 2 and the approval of low-power terrestrial broadcast stations" promise to make the home video market even more competitive than it is today.
Finally, as cable systems expand their offerings to include twoway, non-video, non-entertainment services, such as videotext,
teletext, or other forms of expression,84 they will face new or expanded competition from an entirely different set of competitors,
including newspapers, telephone companies, or other entities. Even
as to possible cable services that do constitute forms of human expression encompassed within the First Amendment protections,
cable companies are facing, and will face increasingly, competition
from diverse sources. Data and "non-expressive" information are
now regularly furnished over telephone company, resale, and specialized common carrier circuits. Satellite-to-rooftop and digital radio systems, like those proposed by Satellite Business Systems Inc.
and Xerox's X-TEN, will provide additional competition. Furthermore, a host of information providers - of whom Dow Jones,
Knight-Ridder, and Reader's Digest are the best known - are engaging in numerous market experiments testing alternative delivery modes for their data products.
Under these circumstances, the fact that a cable operator may
have an exclusive franchise to provide cable services hardly gives
him a monopoly over the entertainment and information services
in a community. In the same way that the newspaper publisher in
a one-newspaper town faces competition from other media, the
cable operator vies for consumers' dollars and attention, not only
with a wide range of video services, but also with a proliferation of
services provided by radio, newspapers, books, and magazines.
When the information marketplace is so large, the danger that any
one medium could dominate it is essentially chimerical.
The realization of First Amendment objectives is thus best
found, not in government regulation to assure "access" or "fair82. See FCC Gen. Docket No. 80-603.
83. See FCC BC Docket No. 78-253.
84. See FCC Cable Television Bur. Staff Report, supra, note 6, at 5.
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ness" or "balance" in the expression of conflicting views, but in a

private information industry that features a multiplicity of different outlets using different technologies to engage in vigorous and
antagonistic speech. Such a system permits the robust expression
of differing views on diverse issues, and ensures "balance" in the
sense that everything worth saying about an issue will be spoken,
and will be available to be heard. The public would inevitably be
exposed to contrasting points of view on issues of importance, and
the individual's freedom to choose from that which is available
would be preserved. This freedom and this diversity of information
is best guaranteed if the communications marketplace is left free
of government regulation," consistent with the First Amendment's
purpose to promote, in Justice Brandeis' words, "the power of reason as applied through public discussion" and to prevent "silence
coerced by law." 86

C.

Cable and the Communications Act

Against this constitutional background, it is useful to examine
the current status of content regulation of cable under the Communications Act. Of the three principal content-related requirements imposed on broadcasters - reasonable access rules, the fairness doctrine, and equal time requirements87 - only the latter two
have been applied to cable. Both fairness and equal time rules
were first applied to cable under the "reasonably ancillary" doctrine,88 with the equal-time requirements later given statutory status in the cable context pursuant to section 315 of the Act."
Whether the same section gives statutory status to the fairness
doctrine as applied to cable is an open question. 0 It is also unclear
whether the statutory requirement of reasonable access for candidates" applies to cable," and the FCC has not sought to impose
this requirement on cable operators either by rule or by enforce85. See FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 595, 101 S. Ct. 1266, 1273 (1981)
(upholding FCC authority to rely "on market forces to promote diversity in radio entertainment formats"); text at notes 49-54, supra.
86. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (concurring opinion).
87. See text at notes 27-30, supra.
88. First Report and Order in Docket 18397, 20 F.C.C.2d 201, 219-20 (1969).
89. 47 U.S.C. § 315(c)(1).
90. See FCC Cable Television Bur. Staff Report, supra note 6, at 21. The doctrine has
been applied to cable via an FCC rule. 47 C.F.R. § 76.209 (1980).
91. 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7).
92. See FCC Cable Television Bur. Staff Report, supra note 6, at 22-24.
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ment in individual cases.93 In light of the constitutional problems
posed by these content-based regulations, the. diversity already
present in the home video and home information markets, and the
judicially recognized similarities between cable television and
newspapers, there is a strong case for avoiding application of the
fairness doctrine and reasonable access rules to cable, since no
statute explicitly requires such application.
Practical considerations point in the same direction, as the
FCC's staff has recognized.9" Cable systems currently being built
have the capacity to offer 100 television channels or more; assuming operation 24 hours per day, such systems could generate at
least 2400 hours per day of television or other information programming. Imposition of content-related regulation such as the
fairness doctrine would lead inevitably to log-keeping, pre-screening, or tape retention, imposed either as a government requirement
to allow meaningful enforcement, or voluntarily by the operator as
a defense against allegations of rule violations. In either event, the
costs and burdens of such regulation would be staggering, given the
information capacity of contemporary cable systems.
As the Congress considers amendments to the Communications
Act,94 . it should focus on these practical issues as well as on the
inherent diversity in video systems and the information media and
on the First Amendment problems with government telling a portion of the press what it must show. Rather than seeking to assure
"balance," "fairness," and "access" in various media through government intervention and regulation, the government should remove regulatory impediments to the growth and operation of the
media, allowing each to compete with the others in an economic
and informational sense.' 5 Such a focus may well lead to the conclusion that content regulation of cable television is not an appropriate means of serving the public interest in a free and vigorous
press.
93. See id. at 22.
94. See id. at 47-49.
94.1. See, e.g., S. 2172, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (introduced Mar. 4, 1982, by Senator Goldwater; titled the "Cable Telecommunications Act of 1982").
95. For example, despite the recent overturning of the FCC's access rules, FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979), the cable industry's commitment to access has continued to expand. Few channels have been terminated, and today cable provides over 1018
access channels nationwide. With the evolution of "tiering," moreover, a marketing concept
in which cable's product is divided into separate packages, cable is providing free public
access channels as a marketing technique to gain consumer acceptance and expand market
penetration.
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IV.
State and Local Regulation of Cable Television
The issue of expression-related requirements imposed on cable
systems arises at the state and local levels, as well as the federal
level. The National League of Cities (NLC), for example, has issued a "Code of Good Cable Television Franchising Conduct" that
urges cities, when franchising cable operations, "to assure local
public, community, educational, municipal and leased cable access
and to promote local programming."" A recent NLC publication
explains that such requirements are "justified for several reasons:
(1) cable systems use a public resource - the public-right-of-way;
(2) cable systems are almost always geographic monopolies; and (3)
cable television provides (or has the potential to provide) important public services . . . .""
In the Midwest Video II case," the Supreme Court struck down
third-party access requirements similar to those proposed by the
NLC. The Court based its decision on the lack of FCC authority to
impose such requirements, however, and did not reach the constitutional question." The appellate courts that have reached the
First Amendment issue - in Home Box Office*00 and Midwest
Video II101 - have done so in the context of federal regulation,
and the First Amendment discussions have not been central to the
courts' holdings. Thus, the question of the constitutional validity
of state or local imposition of cable access requirements as part of
the franchising process has not been addressed directly by any
court. The balance of this paper is devoted to discussion of this
question, approaching it from two perspectives: one involving the
quasi-monopoly status of cable and the claim by some that it is
imbued with the public interest as an outlet for public expression,
an approach that may lead to cable operator actions being treated
as state action; and the other from the perspective of cable operators being treated as wholly private entities protected from actions
of the state.
96. National League of Cities, Code of Good Cable Television Franchising Conduct 2
(undated).
97. National League of Cities, Legislative Workshop-Cable Television 1 (Mar. 2, 1981).
98. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
99. See text at notes 59-60, supra.
100. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977).
101. Midwest Video Corp. v. FCC, 571 F.2d 1025 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'd on other grounds,
440 U.S. 689 (1979).
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Cable Television and State Action

The guarantees contained in the Bill of Rights, including the
First Amendment, by their terms shield individuals only from governmental action. When terms like "freedom of speech" or "freedom of the press" are used, the implicit premise is freedom from
interference by the government. When a private entity becomes
too closely associated with the government, however, it risks having its actions treated as governmental actions. The judicial doctrine that treats private actions as those of the government has
come to be known as the "state action" doctrine. 0
The possibility that the close relationship between cable systems
and local governments might lead to a state action finding is one
that must be taken seriously. Such a finding would jeopardize, if
not completely destroy, the cable operator's ability to perform
publishing and editing functions. Essentially, he would have no
First Amendment rights, since he would be treated as part of the
government. Thus, rather than being protected from acts of the
government, the operator would become one against whom the
public would be protected. He would, like the government, have
"no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter, or its content". 03 Just as the government, absent a "substantial governmental interest," may not deny use of
the city streets to those who wish to picket or leaflet,10 so the
cable operator would be unable to deny use of his channels to
those persons seeking access. The operator would cease to function
as an "electronic editor" and would instead be obliged to accept
programming from almost anyone willing to pay for the time.10 5
A recent lower court case gives concreteness to the difference between what a private entity may do to restrict speech by others
and what a governmental entity may do. In Barnstone v. University of Houston,' 6 a regular viewer of a public television station
won an injunction to force the station to show a controversial film
that had been scheduled and later cancelled. The district judge
reasoned that, because the station is owned by a state university, it
102. See Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391
U.S. 308 (1968).
103. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
104. See id. at 98-99 and cases cited therein.
105. See Rothman, supra note 69.
106. 514 F. Supp. 670 (S.D. Tex. 1980), rev'd, 660 F.2d 137 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc
granted, 662 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1981).
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is a "public forum" that cannot engage in a "prior restraint" of
speech (here, the speech of the film's producer), at least not without meeting "an extremely heavy burden" of justification and
meeting procedural requirements. 0 7
The possibility that state action might be found in the cable
context is today a live issue. In the broadcast context, the Supreme
Court in Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee'"8 divided on the question of whether or not the
pervasive FCC regulation of conventional broadcasting means that
broadcasters' action should be treated as governmental action,
with four Justices saying it should not,' 09 two saying it should,"'0
and three not deciding the issue."' With regard to cable, at least
one court and the FCC staff have suggested that local regulation
might well subject a cable operator to a state action finding." The
test in every case is "whether there is a sufficiently close nexus
between the State and the challenged action of the regulated
entity."" 8
Several elements of the local government-cable operator relationship suggest that the existence of "a sufficiently close nexus"
could be found. First, the NLC implies that cable should be viewed
-

in a way found relevant by the Supreme Court -

as "a heavily.

regulated utility with at least something of a governmentally protected monopoly."" Second, the initiative with regard to many of
the cable access requirements frequently comes from local governments, not the cable operator, so that, in a third party's challenge
to access practices, the government could be found to have "put its
own weight on the side of the .

. .

practice[s].""'

Third, many lo-

cal governments collect cable franchise fees that are taken as a
percentage of gross receipts; such fees suggest a "symbiotic rela107. 514 F. Supp. at 689-90. But see Muir v. Alabama Educational Television Commission, 656 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir.), rehearing en banc granted, 662 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1981).
108. 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
109. Id. at 114-21 (Burger, C.J., joined by Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ.) and at 148-51
(Douglas, J., concurring in the judgment).
110. Id. at 178-81 (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 146-47 (White, J., concurring) and at 148 (Blackmun, J., joined by Powell, J.,
concurring).

112. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 46 n.82 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); FCC Cable Television Bur. Staff Report, supra note 6, at 45-46.
113. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 357.
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tionship" between government and the cable operator,"' with the
government's "position of interdependence" making it "a joint participant in the challenged activity."1 17 Finally, because cable television may be considered to serve the public interest and, in the
NLC's words, to provide "important public services," it may be
viewed as quasi-governmental, performing functions that would
otherwise be performed by the state or local government. 18
However, as the Chief Justice wrote for a Supreme Court plurality in the CBS case, in refusing to hold that FCC regulation of
broadcasters made the latter's action governmental action:
[I]t would be anomalous for us to hold, in the name of promoting
the constitutional guarantees of free expression, that the day-today editorial decisions of broadcast licensees are subject to the
kind of restraints urged by respondents. To do so in the name of
the First Amendment would be a contradiction. Journalistic discretion would in many ways be lost to the rigid limitations that
the First Amendment imposes on Government. Application of
such standards to broadcast licensees would be antithetical to the
very ideal of vigorous, challenging debate on issues of public
interest.'
Rather than viewing cable system action as state action, therefore,
the courts as well as Congress and state legislatures should treat
cable systems as the private entities that they are and thus as pro116. Id.
117. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961).
118. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (reversing trespassing conviction of
Jehovah's Witness who had been passing out literature on streets of company-owned town).
This "public function" approach to state action is sometimes viewed as an alternative to the
"nexus" approach, but the Supreme Court has been unwilling in recent years to find state
action based solely on the performance by a private entity of public functions. The issue has
arisen with particular frequency with regard to shopping centers. Compare Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) and Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972) with Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968). Nevertheless, the public function approach may continue to be viable as an adjunct to the
"nexus" analysis, and certainly the existence of public function elements in cable is likely to
be used by any litigant trying to establish a "sufficiently close nexus" between local government and a cable operator.
Some local governments are apparently considering municipal ownership or partial ownership of their cable systems. See, e.g., City of Issaquah v. Teleprompter Corp., 93 Wash. 2d
567, 611 P.2d 741 (1980). See generally Paul Kagan Associates, Cable TV Regulation, No.
137 (April 2, 1981). When substantial governmental ownership is involved, a state action
finding in constitutional cases can be regarded as a near-certainty, and thus a cable system
owned by government risks losing First Amendment protection. See text at notes 102-04,
supra.
119. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1973)
(plurality opinion of Burger, C.J.).
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tected fully by the First Amendment.
The result of a state action finding in the cable context would be
troubling not only for cable operators but for society as a whole.
While the cable operator would lose his ability to act as an editor
and program creator, providing the community with information
and entertainment, the community would ultimately lose the most,
for in the long run any governmental access scheme for cable risks
discouraging the investment necessary to construction of cable systems. The community would thereby lose the new sources of information and entertainment that cable construction makes possible
when cable systems are protected by the First Amendment.

B. Local Access
Amendment

Requirements

and

the

First

1. Strict Scrutiny and State Interests
If cable operators are accorded the same First Amendment
rights as are newspaper publishers and editors, as some courts
have urged,12 0 then any restrictions on speech involved in the
granting of a cable franchise would have to be not merely justified
as serving some general notion of the public interest, but would
need to be justified by a "compelling state interest"121 and be "narrowly tailored to [meet] legitimate objectives."' In the context of
parade permits, picketing, and the like, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that, when the exercise of free speech rights must
be preceded by the granting of a license, the licensing authority
must generally limit itself to regulating the "time, place, and manner" of the expressive activity and may not regulate or otherwise
interfere with the content of the expression.12 3
The interests asserted by the NLC to justify access requirements
120. See text at notes 61-66, supra.
121. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33, 34 n.75 (1973).
122. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 101 (1972). See also United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
123. See Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) and cases cited
therein. Even in the case of regulated monopolies, and even where the speech involved may
be characterized as "commercial" (which the cable operator's speech may not, at least to the
extent it is similar to a newspaper's or broadcaster's), the Court has required that the regulating authority assert a "substantial" governmental interest for restricting speech and
demonstrate that the restriction "is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(holding invalid a regulation barring an electric utility from advertising to promote the use
of electricity).
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in the "licensing" or franchising process are three, as noted above:
cable television uses the public rights of way, often has a geographic monopoly, and provides important public services.""
The first of these, use of public rights of way, at best suggests an
argument for regulating the "time, place, and manner" of cable expression, but does not provide any rationale for regulating content.
Government at all levels confers numerous rights to use public resources for private ends, such as the right to use the city streets
and the air and shipping lanes. Users may be required to pay for
the costs of their usage, and the government may allocate usage
rights when necessary. In addition, even speech along a right of
way may be restricted as to "time, place, and manner," as when a
newspaper is told where to place its newsstands on the public sidewalks. But neither municipal authority to regulate the location of
newsstands nor the use of city streets by news delivery trucks justifies municipal regulation mandating access to the newspaper itself, or the mandated dedication of its printing plant or pages to
particular groups or functions.
In the cable context, this analysis suggests that, just as the right
to free speech "do[es] not mean that everyone with opinions or
beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at
any time,"'25 so cable operators may not string wires anywhere
that they choose to do so. The use of public utility poles or underground wire conveyances may legitimately be regulated by local
government, just as it may regulate traffic on city streets. 2 6 It may
also charge cable operators a franchise fee for any costs imposed on
the public, although these costs are likely to be minimal.'"2 But
access requirements imposed on cable do not serve similar regulatory ends; in the words of the Supreme Court, they "reach . . .
beyond mere traffic regulation to restrictions on expression." 2 8
Unless such expression-related restrictions serve compelling state
interests, they should be held unconstitutional.
The second argument of the NLC, relating to cable's geographic
124. National League of Cities, supra note 97, at 1.
125. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965).
126. See id. at 554-55.
127. With regard to the utility poles used by cable television, in most communities local
government was long ago paid back for the cost of the poles by electrical and telephone
utilities. Cable's use is derivative, and there are essentially no fixed or marginal costs to be
recouped when cable television uses public utility poles.
128. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. at 556 n.14. See also Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 99 n.6 (1972).
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monopoly, is discussed at length above."' The argument is flawed
in two ways: first, because even the fact of monopoly calls at most
for allocative or antitrust regulation, not for content regulation;
and second, because cable television is not in fact a monopoly if
the total market for video or information and entertainment services is considered, as it should be. Just as the Supreme Court in
Tornillo refused to force a newspaper to give up page space simply
because newspaper publishing is a natural economic monopoly in
many communities,130 so cable operators should not be forced to
yield their First Amendment rights because of an inaccurate characterization of their service as a monopoly.
The NLC's third argument is that, because cable provides "important public services," it should be regulated to ensure that the
medium functions in some way deemed socially beneficial by the
government. This argument could apply as well to newspapers,
which certainly serve many community needs, but no such argument would be acceptable in the newspaper context.' It would
not be acceptable, and is not acceptable with regard to cable, because it is simply not a legitimate role for government to regulate
speech for socially beneficial purposes. As the Supreme Court held
in Buckley v. Valeo, any attempt by government to restrict the
speech of one group (here, cable operators) "in order to enhance
the relative voice of others" (here, the public in general or that
part of the public benefiting from access channels or important
public services) "is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." 3 2
The Buckley opinion further rejects an apparent underlying premise of the NLC's approach. When the NLC asserts "compelling
interests" for restrictions on cable speech arising from cable's use
of rights of way, its "monopoly" status, and its provision of services, the NLC is in effect arguing that cable must allow persons
access who otherwise could not afford to purchase access to the
mass media. But the Buckley Court, in discussing the legitimacy of
an asserted governmental interest in balancing the relative ability
of individuals and groups to influence elections, categorically re129. See text at notes 70-83, supra.
130. 418 U.S. at 248-54. See text at notes 76-80, supra.
131. Moreover, the services named by the NLC-"two-way hook-ups between public institutions such as hospitals, police and fire stations, and schools," National League of Cities,
supra note 97, at 1-are frequently ones that cable systems provide because their contracts
with local government require them to do so. It is thus somewhat circular for the NLC to be
using these services as an argument in favor of content regulation.
132. 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam).
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jected such a dollar-based approach to the First Amendment, stating that "protection against governmental abridgement of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial
ability to engage in public discussion."I's The social risk that some
individual members of society may lack ability to obtain access to
a means of communication cannot justify the imposition of government regulation that restricts the speech of the press, electronic or
otherwise, in order to ensure such access, without destroying the
very purpose of the First Amendment.1 3 4
2. Voluntariness and Waiver
While restrictions on cable operators' speech might be struck
down if imposed unilaterally on a current franchisee, it can be argued that the situation as to competing bidders for a single
franchise is legally distinguishable. The process by which a cable
operator obtains a franchise has elements of a "bargained-for contract,"3 5 although in practice the local government is usually in a
substantially better bargaining position than the operator and is
largely able to dictate the contract's terms.*3 The contractual element in local franchises suggests that the successful bidder had
done nothing more than agree to limit his constitutional rights; he
is restricting his speech as part of a contract, in exchange for valuable consideration. Moreover, even if the contractual model is not
accepted, local governments may argue that they are entitled, in
choosing among bidders, to select the one that appears best able
and most willing to meet the community's needs for particular
kinds of programming and access.
This reasoning, however, is inconsistent with a long line of Supreme Court cases holding that the receipt of public benefits may
not be conditioned on the waiver of constitutional rights, particularly First Amendment rights. In Perry v. Sindermann,'3 7 the
Court held that a state college professor could not be dismissed
because he publicly criticized the college. The Court said:
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that
133. Id. at 49.
134. See generally Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'1 Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
135. Note, Cable Television: The Practical Implications of Local Regulation and Control, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 391, 398 (1978).
136. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, - U.S. -, 102 S. Ct. 835,
837 (1982).
137. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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even though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental
benefit and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which
the government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a
person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in freedom of speech. For if the
government could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise of those
freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would
allow the government to 'produce a result which [it] could not
command directly.' Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526. Such
interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.138
The Court's statement that free speech rights may not be abridged
through the withholding of a governmental benefit has recently
been reaffirmed in the context of cases holding that public employment may not be denied because of political beliefs or affiliations."" The doctrine's roots, moreover, go back over half a century
to cases holding that the state "may not impose conditions [on the
grant of a privilege] which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights."14 0
The analogy between a state employing a person and a locality
granting a. cable franchise is a strong one. Both involve a relationship that is contractual,14 1 but in which the government is plainly
the dominant party. Just as other persons may be willing to take a
public job denied to one person because of his beliefs, so others are
often willing to bid for a cable franchise denied to one person because he refuses to grant public access or to allow government control of programming. Perry and related cases teach that, even
though others may be willing to take the job or the franchise on
the government's terms, neither a public job nor a cable franchise
may be denied "on a basis that infringes . . . [the] interest in free-

dom of speech."14 2
138. Id. at 597.
139. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 514-16 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 359
(1976) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White and Marshall, JJ.) and at 375
(Stewart, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
140. Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 594 (1926). See also Thomas v. Review Bd.
of the Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("a person may not be
compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in
an otherwise available public program").
141. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 594 (1972) (renewable, one-year
contract).
142. Id. at 597.
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The cable franchising process thus establishes a tension between
the cable operator's freedom to show what he chooses and his interest in obtaining a franchise, without which he cannot show anything. The foregoing analysis raises a serious question whether access and program requirements have any place in cable franchise
negotiations or agreements. Local governments must be extremely
sensitive to their impact on, or interference with, the First Amendment rights of cable operators.

V.
Conclusion
The changes in cable television over the past two decades mean
that a cable operator functions today much like a newspaper editor
or publisher. Newspapers are accorded virtually unfettered freedom to publish what they choose to publish, regardless of what the
government may wish to see published. This freedom reflects the
decision of the founders of our governmental system to avoid the
dangers of government suppression and selection of speech and to
rely instead on a multitude of voices, with the individual free to
select critically the information by which he will be persuaded.
This decision of the founders, embodied in the First Amendment, has not been carried forward into the broadcast realm. The
government tells broadcasters some of what they must broadcast
and attempts to mandate diversity through federal regulation instead of allowing the information marketplace to produce it
through a multiplicity of news and entertainment outlets. Even in
the broadcast area, however, the courts and the FCC have begun to
recognize the value of less regulation and more reliance on market
forces.
With regard to cable television, there are those at both the federal and local levels who have attempted, and will continue to attempt, to restrict the First Amendment rights of cable operators in
order to achieve goals of balance or public access. The broadcast
experience with such restrictions, however, should provide a lesson
for the cable situation; government interference with media speech
simply has not led to more diversity, more vigorous programming,
or better service to the public. It has instead invited blandness and
timidity, a result foreseen by the framers of the First Amendment
when they chose to deny to government the power to interfere with
freedom of the press.
Cable television, therefore, should be given the editorial and
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journalistic discretion given to newspapers. The vigorous protection of such discretion would not, as feared by some, lead to the
abuses associated with monopoly power. Cable is just one of many
sources of video programming today and further is just one of
many more providers of news and entertainment in an information
marketplace characterized by diversity and robust competition.
When cable is considered along with television, radio, books, newspapers, magazines, video and audio cassettes and discs, motion pictures, and the like, any asserted governmental justification for content regulation of cable must be categorically rejected.
Finally, to the argument that cable operators voluntarily give up
First Amendment rights in order to obtain a valuable franchise,
the Supreme Court has consistently provided an answer. The government may not condition the granting of a "privilege" - be it a
government job or a cable franchise - on the yielding of freedom
of speech. To allow such conditions would be to allow the destruction through indirect means of rights that the government may not
deny directly.
In short, cable operators are entitled to the freedom of speech
granted newspapers, without conditions and without requirements
of access or balance. To hold otherwise, to deny First Amendment
rights to cable operators, is to undermine not merely cable's constitutional rights but society's interest in diverse expressions of
points of view, uninhibited by fear of governmental interference or
control. It was to preserve just such a societal interest that the
First Amendment was adopted in the 18th century, and the interest is equally, if not more, important as we move into the 21st
century.

